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EXTENSION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL-THE ROAD FROM WADE TO ASH
The sixth amendment of The United States Constitution provides: "[I]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The constitutional guarantee of
right to counsel is no more explicit than this, thus creating the problem of
determining at what point in our adversarial criminal system the guarantee
attaches.
As early as Powell v. Alabama' the Supreme Court of the United States
recognized that counsel should be present at any critical stage of the proceedings against the accused, and found the period from arraignment to
trial 'to be "perhaps the most critical period" 2 of such proceedings. More
recently, in Hamilton v. Alabama,3 the Court found the constitutional
guarantee to apply to those types of arraignments where certain rights
could be irretrievably lost through lack of competent counsel. In Escobedo
v. Illinois4 the Court extended the right to counsel of the accused to prearraignment interrogations wherein the accused sought legal advice before
responding to questions. This rationale was logically formalized two years
later in Miranda v. Arizona,5 where the Court set out a definitive set of
rules concerning interrogation of one in custody. A further extension of
the accused's right to counsel came in Mempa v. Rhay.6 There the Court
found state probation revocation hearings, at which deferred sentence
could be imposed, a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. But one of the
most interesting and controversial Supreme Court interpretations of the
sixth amendment guarantee in the last decade, United States v. Wade, held
the right to counsel to attach at a lineup. 8
1287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Court took the Powell logic to. an extreme in Massiah v.
United States, 377 US. 201 (1964), in which it declared incriminating statements overheard by a narcotics agent by use of a radio transmitter installed in petitioner's car were
not admissible at trial because petitioner had been indicted and had retained a lawyer
who, alas, was not present when the incriminating statements were made. In so holding
.he Court declined to rule on a more logical and less far-reaching argument advanced
by petitioner concerning violation of his fourth amendment rights.
2287 U.S. at 57.
3 368 U.S. 52 (1961). And see White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), in which
defendant's plea of guilty at a preliminary hearing in absence of counsel was deemed
violative of defendant's constitutional rights.
4 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Z384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
7388 U.S. 218 (1967) (analyzed in 5 U. RIcH. L. REv. 442 (1971)). United States v.
Wade was in reality one of a trio of cases in which the lineup issue was presented, the
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The Court's logic in Wade hinged basically on the problems of eyewitness identification frequently noted in criminal cases.9 The conclusion
that led to the ultimate extension of the constitutional guarantee was that
significant opportunities for prejudice, whether intentional or merely fortuitous, are inherent in the lineup procedure, and that a defendant in a
criminal case cannot be considered adequately protected from these
prejudicial possibilities unless his attorney is present. The Court concluded
that the presence of counsel at the lineup would significantly promote fairness at the confrontation and lead to a complete elucidation of the issue
of identification at trial.
By recognizing the problem of eyewitness identification as one of sufficient proportion to warrant some supervisory guarantee, and by turning for
that guarantee to a broad interpretation of the sixth amendment's basic
mandate of an accused's right to counsel, the Wade Court opened the
door to a flood of contention in all criminal cases involving eyewitness
identification. 10
II.

APPLICATION

OF

Wade

TO PE-TRIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATIONS

It is not surprising, indeed it was the next logical step, that defendants
should have attempted repeatedly to extend the Wade rationale to pre-trial
photographic identifications. If the defendant has a constitutional right to
other two being Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293 (1967), the latter of which decided the Wade rule would apply prospectively
only, as of June 12, 1967.
The Supreme Court has recently interpreted Wade quite narrowly in Kirby v. Illinois, 40 U.SL.W. 4607 (U.S. June 7, 1972). The majority saw Wade as applying only
to post-indictment lineups and declined to extend it to such procedure before indictment; the dissenters, headed by Mr. Justice Brennan who wrote the Wade opinion, saw
the majority opinion as a limitation of Wade and deemed it merely accidental that both
Wade and Gilbert had involved post-indictment lineups.
8 Other more obvious examples of critical stages are the trial, Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), and the appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The
Court has refused to find that stages in the criminal investigation are critical which
make use of processes of accepted scientific accuracy, q.v. Gilbert v. California, 388 US.
263 (1967) (handwriting exemplars); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(blood samples). The Supreme Court has also rejected fingerprinting as a critical stage.
Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 US. 954 (1964).
9 See 388 U.S. at 228, n. 6 (1967).
30 For an excellent discussion of the problems created by the sweep of Wade, not
just in cases involving eyewitness identifications but in all cases in which the accuracy of the fact-finding process is suspect, see, Note, Lawyers and Lineups, 77 YALE
L.J. 390 (1967). On Wade generally, see 14 LoyoLA L. REv. 222 (1967-68); 63 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 251 (1968); 2 SuFFOLR U.L. Rev. 117 (1968); 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 830 (1969);
9Wm. & MARY L. REv. 528 (1967).
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have his attorney present at a pre-trial lineup to detect and properly note
any prejudicial procedure in the attempt at identification that might occur,
then should not a defendant also have such a right at a pre-trial photographic
identification where the possibilities of prejudice, if different, are no less
real? And should not this right be even more pronounced in reference to
a proceeding at which the defendant himself is not present?" Such arguments, the basic foundation of the defendants' claims, seem to make sense,
but the overwhelming majority of courts have turned a deaf ear to the
defendants' pleas.
A. Majority Vie'w as to Extension of Wade to Pre-Trial
Photographic Identifications
Every circuit of the intermediate system of federal courts has heard argument concerning problems of photographic identification. The First and
Eighth Circuits have yet to decide the right to counsel issue,12 but every
other Circuit save two have adamantly refused to extend Wade to photographic identifications.' 3 The exceptions are the Third Circuit, in which
United States v. Zeiler'4 reversed earlier Third Circuit precedent' 5 without
referring to it, and the District of Columbia Circuit, in which the recent
"1 See generally, Comment, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1019 (1968).
12 They have dealt with photographic identifications, but not in sixth amendment
terms. See United States v. Valez, 431 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Butler,
426 F.2d 1275 (1st Cir. 1970).
13Second Circuit: United States v. Mojica, 442 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1971); United States
v. Roth, 430 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United States
v. Sanchez, 422 F.2d 1198 (2d Cit. 1970); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, Haywood v. United States, 396 U.. 852 (1969). Fourth Circuit:
United States v. Canty, 430 F.2d 1332 (4th Cit. 1970); United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d
696 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1025 (1970); United States v. Marson, 408
F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1968). Fifth Circuit: United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th
Cit. 1970). Sixth Circuit: United States v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827 (6th Cit. 1971). Seventh
Circuit: United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1012 (1970); United States v. Robinson, 406 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 926 (1969). Ninth Circuit: United States v. Washabaugh, 442 F.2d 1127 (9th Cit.
1971); United States v. Fowler, 439 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Williams,
436 F.2d 1166 (9th Cit. 1970); United States v. Roustio, 435 F.2d 923 (9th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Goeduck, 433 F.2d 971 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Edwards, 433
F.2d 357 (9th Cix. 1970); Allen v. Rhay, 431 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Smith, 423 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 930 (1970); United States
v. Sartain, 422 F.2d 387 (9th Cix. 1970). Tenth Circuit: United States v. Von Roeder,
435 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1971); Rech v. United States, 410 F.2d 1131 (10th Cix. 1969);
McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 434 (10th Cix. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969).
14 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cit. 1970).
25 United States v. Conway, 415 F.2d 158 (3d Cix. 1969).
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case of United States v. Ash, 6 a close case with two dissents, also refused to
follow the majority. The sixth amendment of the Federal Constitution, by
virtue of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, applies to all
the states, thus giving frequent occasion to the argument for extension of
Wade to pre-trial photographic identifications in the state courts. Likewise,
7
these courts have almost invariably refused to extend the Wade decision.1
Perhaps California has been the most besieged with pleas to extend Wade
to photographic identifications. However, that state has yet to recant its
long-standing denial that there is sufficient analogy between the Wade lineup logic and the logic applicable to photographic identification procedure
to merit extension of Wade.'8
The courts resort to various arguments in their refusals to extend Wade
into the photographic realm. United States v. Bennett,'9 for example, noted
that to require counsel's presence at a proceeding where the defendant
himself is not present would extend the role of the defense attorney beyond anything envisioned by the classic analyses of assistance given by
counsel. 20 The court in McGee v. United States2' was unable to see anything more involved in a pre-trial photographic identification than "preparation for trial by the Government . . . [in which] there was no form of
confrontation of the accused." 22 The court held this could not merit any
application of the Wade rule. Other arguments often invoked are that skill16 No. 22,340 (D.C. Cir. March 1, 1972).

17 See Reed v. State, -

Del. -,

281 A.2d 142 (1971); Staten v. State, 248 So. 2d 697

(Fla. Ct. App. 1971); Perkins v. State, 228 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1969); Jenkins v. State, 228
So. 2d 114 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969); People v. Martin, 47 Ill. 2d 331, 265 N.E.2d 685 (1970);
People v. Holliday, 47 Ill. 2d 300, 265 N.E.2d 634 (1970); Wells v. State, - Ind. -, 267
N.E.2d 371 (1971); Johnson v. State, 9 Md. App. 327, 264 A.2d 280 (1970); Smith and
Samuels v. State, 6 Md. App. 59, 250 A.2d 285 (1969); Barnes v. State, 5 Md. App. 144,
245 A.2d 626 (1968); Commonwealth v. Getaway, 355 Mass. 433, 245 NZE.2d 423 (1969);
Stevenson v. State, - Miss. -, 244 So. 2d 30 (1971); State v. Randolph, 186 Neb. 297,
183 N.W.2d 225 (1971); State v. Accor, 276 N.C. 65, 175 S.E.2d 583 (1970); State v.
Searcy, 4 Wash. App. 860, 484 P.2d 417 (1971); State v. Grays, 1 Wash. App. 422,
463 P.2d 182 (1969); Kain v. State, 48 Wis. 2d 212, 179 N.W.2d 777 (1970).
18 See, e.g., People v. Lawrence, 4 Cal. 3d 273, 93 Cal. Rptr. 204, 481 P.2d 212 (1971);
People v. Smiler, 10 Cal. App. 3d 582, 89 Cal. Rptr. 158 (1970); People v. Wesley, 10
Cal. App. 3d 902, 89 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1970); People v. Hawkins, 7 Cal. App. 3d 117, 86
Cal. Rptr. 428 (1970); People v. Lineman, 5 Cal. App. 3d 1, 84 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1970);
People v. Wendling, 4 Cal. App. 3d 317, 84 Cal. Rptr. 310 (1970); People v. Green,
3 Cal. App. 3d 240, 83 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1969); People v. Adair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 92, 82
Cal. Rptr. 460 (1969); People v. Short, 269 Cal. App. 2d 746, 75 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1969);
People v. Padgitt, 264 Cal. App. 2d 443, 70 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1968).
'9 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969).
20 Id. at 899-900.
21402 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969).
22 Id. at 436.
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ful cross-examination can bring out the details of any pre-trial photographic
display, 23 and that because the photographs themselves are available in
evidence there is no need for counsel 2 4
The argument that skillful cross-examination may serve as a useful safeguard in photographic identification questions has an interesting genesis
since it apparently arose in a case having absolutely nothing to do with a
defendant's right to counsel. In that case, Simmons v. United States,25
the United States Supreme Court decided that no denial of due process of
law resulted when photographs of suspects were shown to various witnesses
while the perpetrators of the crime were still at large. No right to counsel
issue was or could have been logically raised in Simmons, because there
was not yet any defendant; no arrest had been made. It was because of
this, in the interest of expediency and public good, as well as justice to
innocent suspects, that the Court ruled as it did. Yet courts, in innumerable
cases2 6 where the primal issue before the bar was right to counsel after
arrest, not denial of due process before arrest, have persisted in eager resort
to remarks made by Mr. Justice Harlan in Simmons. Particularly popular
in cases where an extension of Wade to photographic identification is sought
is the Simmons test to determine if a pre-arrest photographic showing has
been in substantial derogation of rights of the accused, i.e. was the showing
"so impermissably suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification." 2 7 Some courts have recognized the different facts involved in Simmons, and have noted that the above remarks
seem applicable nonetheless; 28 but some courts have resorted to Simmons
without noting the fundamental factual differences between the Simmons
case and the usual right to counsel case.29 This latter procedure cannot but
adversely affect the credibility of the courts so doing.
2

3See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696, 700 (4th Cir. 1969); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888,

900 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, Haywood v. United States, 396 U.S. 852 (1969); United
States v. Robinson, 406 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1969).
24 Comment, 43 N.Y.U.. REv. 1019, 1025 (1968).
25 390 U. S. 377 (1968).
26 Cases cited note 23, supra.
27 390 U.S. at 384 (1968).
28
E.g., United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v.
Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 900 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, Haywood v. United States, 396
U.S. 852 (1969).
29 See, e.g., United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696, 700 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1025 (1970). In his dissent in Collins, Judge Winter noted the inapplicability
of Shinnons, stating:
I do not read Sinmions as modifying the application of Wade and Gilbert to post
custody identifications as I read the majority's opinion to suggest. Simmons was
not in custody at the time of the identification made from photographs. '. .In
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B. Minority Vie'w of Zeiler and Ash
In contrast to the voluminous precedent refusing to extend the Wade
decision to pre-trial photographic identifications, 30 there is a paucity of authority contra. 31 The most often-cited case so extending Wade is United
States v. Zeiler,3 2 supra, which made the Third Circuit the first circuit of
the system of intermediate federal courts to extend Wade. This pre-eminence of Zeiler is unfortunate, for the court confines all argument on the
issues to a single paragraph, the extent of which would have been inadequate
for purposes far less sweeping than overturning an established precedent of
33
the magnitude here concerned.
In Zeiler the appeal concerned a so-called "Commuter Bandit" who
allegedly had been committing a series of bank robberies in the Pittsburgh
area over a period of more than five years. Zeiler was the suspect arrested
in connection with these robberies. After the arrest a lineup was held at
which Zeiler's counsel had been present in compliance with Wade. It later
appeared, however, that after Zeiler had been taken into custody and counsel
appointed, but before the already scheduled lineup had been held, the FBI
had privately confronted each eyewitness with a series of photographs for
identification. Zeiler contended that Wade ought to apply equally to such
prejudicial circumstances as these, and the Third Circuit agreed, noting
"[t] he considerations that led the court in Wade to guarantee the right of
counsel at lineups apply equally at photographic identifications conducted
after the defendant is in custody." 34 As reasons therefore the court enumerated: (1) the dangers of suggestion inherent in a corporal lineup to be as
prevalent in a photographic identification; (2) the absence of the defendant
himself at such photographic identification making accurate reconstruction
at the trial even more difficult; and (3) the possibility of complete nullifithe instant case Collins was in custody and a corporeal lineup had been held.
This is the crucial distinction between Simmons and the instant case. Id. at 701.
And see United States v. Robinson, 406 F.2d 64, 67 (7th Cir. 1969).
30 Cases cited notes 13, 17 and 18, supra.
31 In addition to Zeiler and Ash, discussed in the above text, see Cox v. State, 219
So. 2d 762 (Fla. Ct. App. 1969) (court held use of videotape for identification purposes
to be an unlawful evasion of Wade); People v. Rowell, 14 Mich. App. 190, 165 N.W.2d
423, 427 (1968) (Levin, J., concurring) ("I am persuaded . . . that on principle photographic identifications should be prohibited where the defendant is in custody unless
the witness is physically incapacitated from going to a place where a lineup can be
conducted."); Thompson v. State, 85 Nev. 134, 451 P.2d 704 (1969); Commonwealth
v. Whiting, 439 Pa. 205, 266 A.2d 738 (1970).
32427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970). On Zeiler generally, see 9 DUQUESNE L. REv. 257
(1970); 16 Vsu. L. REv. 741 (1971); 28 WAsH. & LEE L. Rv. 173 (1971).
33

427 F.2d at 1307.

34

Id.
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cation of the constitutional safeguards of Wade due to use by the police of
photographs prior to lineup.3 5 With these three arguments Zeiler extended
Wade.
More recent, and far more extensive in treatment, is United States v. Ash, 36
decided March 1st of this year by the District of Columbia Circuit. The
facts of Ash make the perils of eyewitness identification spectacularly apparent. On August 26, 1965, a gunman entered a bank in Washington, D. C.
and ordered everyone in the bank not to move. A few seconds later another
man rushed into the bank, scooped up the money and fled. The entire robbery took three to four minutes. At the trial Ash was identified as the gunman by testimony of incredible dubiousness. A bank teller said Ash looked
similar to the gunman, but she could not be sure because the robber had
worn a stocking mask. Another teller believed Ash to be the gunman but
also was uncertain because she had been unable to see the gunman's face. A
bank customer said Ash looked "sort of like" the gunman, but he could not
be certain. This witness had observed the gunman for a few seconds as he
approached the bank sans mask. There was also an identification of Ash by
a woman who had been sitting in an automobile outside the bank. She had
seen the gunman without his mask, but admitted that she had gotten only a
fleeting glimpse of him. The only other testimony against Ash was that of
an informer who was serving a sentence in connection with another robbery. He testified that the day before the robbery Ash had asked him to
help rob the bank, that he had refused, and that he had talked to Ash after
the robbery, at which time defendant had told him of the crime. The defense later showed that this witness had been promised certain favors by
the prosecution, including testimony by an Assistant United States Attorney
before the parole board on his behalf.
At a pre-trial hearing it was brought out that at the time of the crime not
one of the four eyewitnesses to the robbery had been able to give the police
a description of the gunman's facial characteristics. The description given
to the police at the time had been merely a description of the felon
as tall and thin. The police later described the robber as a Negro male,
19 years old, six feet tall, 165 pounds, thin build. This was the extent
of the description of the robber until, some .five months after the crime, the
FBI showed mug shots of five Negro males to the identification witnesses.
All four identified Ash as the gunman, but not one was certain. The day
before the trial the FBI and the prosecutor showed five color photographs to
three of the four identification witnesses. All three picked the picture of
Ash. Of the five color pictures shown, only two were full length and only
s5 id.
36 No. 22,340 (D.C. Cir. March 1, 1972).
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two were of tall and slim Negroes. One full length picture of a tall and
37
slender black man was a photograph of Ash.

It was on the basis of this "eyewitness" testimony that Ash was convicted
of robbery. He appealed on two grounds, contending first that the color
photographs were so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification under the rationale of
Simmons v. United States.38 The court declined to rule on the Simmons
test of denial of due process, even though it found ample cause to think
the spirit of the test perhaps had been violated. The court rather chose to
rule on Ash's second contention, that his sixth amendment rights had been
violated by the Government's showing of pictures to identification witnesses
without attendance of counsel. On this ground the court found that Ash's
constitutional rights had been violated.
In concluding that the Wade rationale applied to photographic identifications, the court put great dependence on Zeiler.
While we think the rule is subject to exceptions, we agree with Zeiler's
analysis that the dangers of mistaken identification from uncounseled
lineup identifications set forth in Wade are applicable in large measure
to photographic as well as corporeal identifications.39
The court then proceeded to enumerate these dangers as: (1) the possibility of suggestive influence or mistake, "particularly where witnesses had
little or no opportunity for detailed observation during the crime"; (2) the
difficulty of reconstructing suggestive or prejudicial procedure at a photographic identification at which the defendant himself was not present; and
(3) the tendency of a witness' identification to become "frozen" by the
photographic procedure. 40 The majority discounted the panacea of cross
examination often invoked by the courts in refusing to extend Wade, finding that while "[siometimes this may suffice to bring out all pertinent facts,
even at a lineup, . . . this would not suffice under Wade to offset the con-

stitutional infringement wrought by proceedings without counsel."41 The
argument of preservation of the photograph as a curative measure fell to the
same sword, for "it may also be said that a photograph can preserve the
record of a lineup; yet this does not justify a lineup without counsel." 42
87The other was of one Bailey, also arrested in connection with the robbery. Bailey,
whom the prosecution claimed was the party who ran into the bank and scooped up
the money, was acquitted.
38 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
39 No. 22,340 at 15 (D.C.

40/d. at 15.

411d.
421 d.

Cir. March 1, 1972).
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After thus dismissing two of the more frequent arguments of courts having
dealt with the same issue, the court concluded by noting that in certain
circumstances a photographic identification cannot be regarded as a critical
stage of the prosecution requiring attendance of counsel because it is "too
preliminary and preparatory." 43 As illustrative of such preliminary identification, the court noted the practical justification for photographic identification when the defendant is still at large as discussed in Simmons v. United
44
States.

III. Analysis of Zeiler and Ash
Were the courts in Zeiler and Ash justified in their extension of Wade?
Purely on the basis of what is actually stated in Wade they were, for Mr.
Justice Brennan's opinion in that case is a perplexing mixture of logical deductions and blind alleys. Although the Court does refer to "the confrontation compelled by the State between the accused and the victim or
witnesses to a crime," 45 which would tend to exclude extension of the rule
to photographic identifications where the defendant is not present, most of
the rationale of Wade seems equally or more applicable to photographic
identifications. For instance, the Court notes "the degree of suggestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification" 46 as a possibility of prejudice (certainly
equally a danger in arrangement of photographs or posing for the photographs themselves). The Court also notes the likelihood that once the
accused has been picked out of a lineup by a witness, that witness will be
unlikely to change his mind about that identification later 47 (also an equal
danger with photographs). Another point made by Wade and equally or
more relevant to photographic proceedings, is that "the accused's inability
effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred at the lineup
may deprive him of his only opportunity meaningfully to attack the credibility of the witness' courtroom identification." 48 Ash makes all of these
points in the course of its justification for extending Wade)49 and they all
seem to be sound arguments in favor of the Ash decision.
But this is where the logical deductions of Wade lead into the blind
alleys, and certainly the courts in Zeiler and Ash cannot be faulted for
failing to find convincing points which the Supreme Court has failed to
make. The basic issue involved in the Wade case, and in its countless de4

3id. at 17.
44 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
45 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
46 Id. at 228.
47 1d. at 229.
48 Id. at 231-32.

49 See note 40 and accompanying text, supra.
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rivative cases, is not whether the procedure under consideration (whether
lineup or photographic identification) threatens great prejudice, but is
whether, granted an environment in which prejudice is inherent, presence of
counsel is likely to mitigate this prejudicial capacity. Of course the Court
in Wade thought the answer to be in the affirmative, but in justifying
its conclusion it failed to enumerate a single specific thing counsel could do
at a lineup. 5° How much more ambiguous is the lawyer's role at a pre-trial
photographic identification at which his client is not even present? By failing to specifically delineate the function of the lawyer at the lineup, the
Supreme Court's decision not only made the role of counsel at a lineup proceeding ambiguous, but also had the ultimate effect of fostering the implicit suggestion that presence of counsel may be remedial in areas of pretrial procedure only vaguely similar to the lineup itself.
Is a pre-trial photographic identification "only vaguely similar" to a lineup? There are sound arguments that it is. The number of possible procedural variations and permutations in a lineup are incredibly diverse, since
the accused may be asked to speak, move about, wear certain garments,
stand in a prescribed manner or perform any number of other graphic
exercises for observation of witnesses. 51 Any of these possibilities may be
greatly prejudicial to the defendant, and the specific circumstances of the
prejudice may be lost without presence of counsel. By contrast, in a photographic identification the possibilities of prejudice are necessarily more
limited and more predictable, and it is far more likely that the oft-noted
safeguard of cross examination of eyewitnesses will suffice to bring them to
light.
But does the fact that the prejudicial possibilities are less varied in a
photographic identification necessarily mean that they are insignificant?
The majority of the state and federal courts seem to have embraced this
logic either expressly or impliedly in their adamant refusals to extend Wade.
Yet the logic of Zeiler and Ash seems by no means so clearly erroneous as
50 Some cases have recognized this difficulty and attempted to attain some degree of
specificity. E.g., United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1969). For a
detailed discussion of the problem, see Read, Lawyers at Lineups: Constitutional Necessity or Avoidable Extravagance?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 339 (1969).
41 United States v. Ash, No. 22,340 at 30, n. 7, (D.C. Cit. March 1, 1972) (Wilkey,
J, dissenting):
Because so much more takes place at a lineup than at a photographic identification, I disagree with the assertion of the majority that "the same may be said
of the opportunity to examine the participants as to what went on in the course
of the identification, whether at lineup or on photograph." . . . The little drama
of a lineup seems to me much more difficult of reconstruction by examination
of participants than does the photographic identification. Thus I see a greater
need for the participation of counsel in the case of the lineup than in the case
of the photographic identification.
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to justify such treatment, and one is left with the conclusion that the vast
refusing to extend Wade are motivated not so much
majority of courts in.
by an extension of the Wade rationale to a logical extreme, as by an unyielding refusal to extend the constitutional criteria delineated in Wade beyond the point the Supreme Court has made mandatory. While this may' result in some rather bizarre graspings at straws and seeming non sequiturs,
it is not necessarily an exhibition of a frustrating purblindness on the part
of the courts. Wade is, as earlier noted, a case of extreme open-endedness,
the logical extremes of which boggle the imagination. Wade makes the criterion for presence of counsel not simply whether the stage in the criminal
investigatory proceedings in question is critical insofar as it offers legal
complexities completely foreign to the average layman, (which complexities
require presence of one schooled in the law to interpret), but broadens the
test for presence of counsel by embracing a stage of investigation where
there are no legal complexities. Rather, the investigative process itself is
suspect, in that various possibilities of prejudice are inherent within it. This
is the door that Wade opens, and through which Zeiler and Ash were among
the few willing to pass. Indeed, if the courts were to follow Wade en masse
to its logical extremes, the result would be the presence of a very harried
and disgruntled attorney at every stage of criminal investigation wherein
2
the slightest taint of prejudice to the defendant might inhere.
Are Zeiler and Ash correct? Yes and no.
IV. Conclusion
Yes, Zeiler and Ash are correct insofar as they logically extend the Wade
rationale; no, they are not correct insofar as they do not derive from any
workable, limiting criteria that would realistically focus the Wade rationale.
The fault lies more with Wade than with Zeiler or Ash, for the Supreme
Court should have foreseen the sweep of its resort to the sixth amendment
sanction, and defined its conclusion in terms of the specific safeguards it
hoped the lawyer would implement at the lineup. By its failure to do so,
the lower courts face a difficult dilemma from which they must- extricate
themsdlves in the best manner possible. It is not surprising then to find resort
made to standards and arguments with only the most superficial applicability, such as the Simmons test earlier noted.
G2

See id. at 79 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting):

Under the majority opinion, after defendant's arrest the defense counsel would
have to be notified every time a new or old witness was shown any photographs
of the defendant or other suspects. This will constitute an unreasonable interference with post-arrest investigations and would require defense counsel to bd"
present wherever such photographs may be shown by police or- FBI personnel
to any witness anywhere-in the country.
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It is submitted that while the Simmons test, reflective of the expediency
of photographic identifications before an arrest, has been made, is not the
correct one in considering whether to extend Wade to photographic identifications made after an arrest; some sort of limiting test is needed. Such
a test should be more specific than the Simmons test and should require a
showing of derogation of the defendant's rights in some way that presence
of counsel could remedy. This is more in keeping with the classic analyses
of the lawyer's function as well as more likely to result in a meaningful
application of Wade. It is important to note that Wade is not a case which
calls for a per se exclusionary rule in reference to evidence obtained in contravention of its constitutional mandate, but rather allows identification
testimony derivative from a lineup without counsel present to be used
whenever an independent origin for such identification is shown.5 3 This
is a flexible standard and one of utmost importance to keep in mind in light
of the lack of specificity in the decision as a whole. The attorney is not an
end in himself but rather a means to an end. It is but common sense that if
the identification in question had independent origin the lineup could not
have been a critical stage, and the presence of defendant's counsel could
have had no significance. This is equally true of a photographic identification and should be equally noted as the courts debate the extension of Wade
54
into the photographic realm.
R.C.K.

6 388 U.S. 218, 241-42 (1967).
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It seems that neither Ash nor Zeiler would have come out as they did with the

conscientious application of a test such as advocated here. In Zeiler, defense counsel
was able to reconstruct at trial the circumstances under which the pretrial identification
had been conducted as well as produce the actual photographs used. United States v.
Zeiler, 278 F. Supp. 112 (W.D. Pa. 1968). The defense, of course, had strong argument
in Zeiler that the showing of photographs destroyed the effectiveness of the subsequent
lineup held as per Wade. On remand, however, the court deemed Zeiler's identification
to have independent origin other than any photographic showings outside the presence
of Zeiler's counsel. United States v. Zeiler, 447 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1971).
In Ash the argument is also strong that the very completeness of the majority's justification for extending Wade indicates no extension is needed.

